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Economic Growth in the Lower Yangzi 
Region of China in 1911–1937: A 
Quantitative and Historical Analysis 
?
DEBIN MA
Through a detailed reconstruction of 1933 GDP for the two provinces in China’s 
most advanced region, the Lower Yangzi, I show that their per capita income 
was 55 percent higher than China’s average, and they had experienced a growth 
and structural change between 1914–1918 and 1931–1936 comparable to con-
temporaneous Japan and her East Asian colonies. This article highlights the 
unique political institution of early-twentieth-century Shanghai as a city state, 
with its rule of law and secure property rights laying the foundation for eco-
nomic growth in the Lower Yangzi with long-term impact throughout East Asia. 
hinese economic growth is not a recent phenomenon. Thomas 
Rawski contends that China’s per capita GDP growth had already 
attained a similar rate to that of Japan in the first three decades of the 
twentieth century, a period also referred to as the Republican era. In 
fact, economic growth is a theme as enduring as Chinese economic 
history. The question raised by Joseph Needham, subsequently re-
ferred as the Needham puzzle, asked why, given her scientific, techno-
logical, and economic leadership over the rest of the world up until 
perhaps the fourteenth century, the Scientific Revolution and the In-
dustrial Revolution bypassed China. More recently, a new wave of re-
visionist scholarship marked by Kenneth Pomeranz’s book, The Great 
Divergence, extends this thesis with the provocative claim that levels 
of development and living standards in the Lower Yangzi region (his-
torically China’s most advanced area) may have still been on a par 
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with those of Northwestern Europe as late as the eighteenth century. It 
was accidental factors such as the absence of coal deposits in the 
Lower Yangzi coupled with the natural resource windfalls from the 
discovery of the New World for Europe that tilted the balance after-
ward against China.1
 This article focuses on Chinese industrialization in the early twenti-
eth century, which was disproportionately concentrated in the Lower 
Yangzi, a region situated largely within the two administrative prov-
inces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang (hereafter abbreviated as “Jiang-Zhe”). 
It revisits the debate on Chinese economic growth in the Republican 
era from 1911 to 1936 with new, regional-level, quantitative evidence. 
It offers a detailed sectoral reconstruction of the 1930s GDP estimates 
for Jiang-Zhe within the national GDP framework proposed by Liu 
Ta-chung and Yeh Kung-chia. The result shows that per capita GDP in 
Jiang-Zhe in 1930s was about 55 percent higher than China’s national 
average, and 16–29 percent higher than those of Japanese-controlled 
Korea and Manchuria. It ranked only below Japan and Taiwan. Back-
ward projection based on my 1930s Jiang-Zhe benchmark shows 
structural change and per-capita income growth comparable to those 
of Japan and her colonies between the 1910s and 1930s and an eco-
nomic structure far removed from a traditional agrarian economy. 
 A striking feature of this distinctively regional economic growth is 
that it took-off in an era of national disintegration and civil strife. The 
article offers a narrative to demonstrate that the pattern of industriali-
zation, especially its absence during the latter half of the nineteenth 
century followed by a surge in the early twentieth century, speak to 
the importance of ideological and institutional changes in modern 
China. In particular, during China’s tumultuous Warlord era in the 
1910s and 1920s, Shanghai transformed from a colonial treaty port to 
a European style city-state under the rule of Western business elites 
and provided effective public security and private property rights for 
both Chinese and foreign business within its jurisdiction. Despite the 
superior historical conditions of the Lower Yangzi (as recently 
championed by Kenneth Pomeranz and others), early-twentieth-
century economic growth in the Lower Yangzi did not grow out of 
traditional institutions, but rather grew outside of them. Going be-
yond resource endowments, I highlight institutions as crucial deter-
minants of long-term economic change. 
1 See Thomas Rawski, Economic Growth; and Mark Elvin, Patterns. A recent summary of 
this literature on this theme can be found in Ma, “Growth.” 
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FIGURE 1
MAP OF LOWER YANGZI AND OTHER MACRO-REGIONS IN CHINA 
Notes: The bold dark lines mark the provincial boundaries of Jiangsu and Zhejiang. 
 For Jiangsu province, the Lower Yangzi Macro-Region (in dark shade) includes the following 
prefectures in Jiangsu province: Suzhou, Songjiang, Jiangnin, Changzhou, Taicang, Zhengjiang, 
Yangzhou, Tongzhou, Haimen, Haizhou, and the City of Shanghai; and the following prefec-
tures in Zhejiang province: Hangzhou, Jiaxing, Huzhou, Yanzhou, Caoxin, Ningbo, Cuzhou, 
and Jinhua. 
 The prefectures outside the Lower Yangzi Macro-Region (in light shade) are Xuzhou and 
Hua-An for Jiangsu province and Wenzhou and Taizhou for Zhjiang province.  
 The ten macro-regions that Skinner defined are Manchuria, North China, Northwester China, 
Upper, Middle and Lower Yangzis, Yungui, Lingna,n and Southeast Coast. For detailed 
boundaries of macro-regions, see Skinner, “Presidential Addrss,” p. 273. 
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ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE LOWER YANGZI: A REGIONAL 
QUANTITATIVE RECORD 
Lower Yangzi: The Historical Setting 
 The Lower Yangzi is one of the ten economic macro-regions defined 
by William Skinner. Marked in dark shade in the map (Figure 1), it in-
cludes eight of the ten prefectures in Zhejiang province and ten of the 
12 prefectures in the Jiangsu province plus the city of Shanghai. The 
Lower Yangzi macro-region constitutes a relatively integrated cultural, 
economic, and geographic region distinguished from those outlying pre-
fectures in the Jiang-Zhe provinces in levels of development, degrees of 
commercialization, culture, and dialects. 
 Due to the nature of the data, my quantitative analysis in this study is 
largely based on the administrative boundaries of Jiang-Zhe provinces 
with due references to the somewhat smaller “Lower Yangzi Macro-
Region” where necessary, while “Lower Yangzi” will remain a generic 
term for the area.2 At 210,741 square kilometers, roughly 86 percent the 
size of Britain and 56 percent the size of Japan, and with over 60 mil-
lion residents in the 1930s, Jiang-Zhe is a substantial economic region, 
albeit only a small part of China. 
 The Lower Yangzi occupies a central place in recent revisionist lit-
erature on eighteenth-century China. While a full evaluation of this lit-
erature is beyond the scope of this article, I offer a perspective here with 
a regional macroeconomic framework.3 In the absence of any national 
or regional GDP data for China in the mid-eighteenth century, I make 
use of the tax revenue records to get a crude approximation of the per 
capita income difference between the Lower Yangzi and the rest of 
China. My calculation based on Wang Yeh-chien’s study on Qing taxa-
tion shows that the per capita tax revenue contributed by the Jiang-Zhe 
provinces in 1753 was 1.44 times the national average.4
2 Skinner also defines a so-called Lower Yangzi Core which would only include the prefec-
tures of Suzhou, Songjiang, Jiangnin, Changzhou Taicang, and the city of Shanghai in Jiangsu 
province and the prefectures of Hangzhou, Jiaxing, and Huzhou in Zhejiang province. This 
small and undoubtedly most advanced and commercialized region, often known as the Jiangnan 
region, is most often discussed by Pomeranz and Li Bozhong, See Li Bozhong, Agricultural 
Development, chapter 1. 
3 A recent summary of this revisionist scholarship can be found in Ma, “Growth.” 
4 Tax data are from Wang, Land Taxation, p. 70. Wang’s grand total is used. Population is for 
1787 from p. 87 (table 5.1). To use per capita tax revenue as a proxy for per capita income car-
ries the strong assumption that tax revenue is proportional to income and that the taxation sys-
tem was efficient and corruption-free, or at least the degree of corruption varies little by region. 
For Wang’s argument for a relatively efficient tax system in 1753, see chapters 4 and 5. Inciden-
tally, the 1.44 figure derived is nearly identical to the 1.43 ratio equivalent for that of 1910s as 
shown later in Table 3. 
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 The “guess-estimates” in the global dataset by Angus Maddison show 
the British, West European, and European (including East Europe but 
not Russia and Turkey) per-capita income figures are 2, 1.7, and 1.45 
times the level of China in 1700, respectively.5 If the Jiang-Zhe per cap-
ita income could be assumed to be 1.44 times of that of China, as im-
plied in the tax records, this would equal 72 percent, 85 percent, and 
about 100 percent of the per capita income of Britain, Western Europe, 
and Europe overall, respectively. It would also be slightly higher than 
Maddison’s guess-estimated level for early-nineteenth-century Japan.6
Clearly, both tax-revenue-based, regional-income-difference estimates 
and Maddison’s guess-estimates are highly speculative. But this exer-
cise is useful to show that a regional perspective could alter our pre-
existing views on Jiang-Zhe’s relative backwardness in the early mod-
ern period. 7
Shanghai-Based Industrialization: The Regional Picture 
 In the 1930s Shanghai alone produced 41 percent of national manu-
facturing output (48 percent if excluding Japanese-controlled Manchu-
ria); housed 50 to 60 percent of cotton spindles throughout the 1910s 
and 1930s; and generated about 50 percent of national electricity in the 
1920s, almost twice that of the major British industrial cities of Man-
chester and Glasgow. In the 1930s, Shanghai alone absorbed 46.4 per-
cent of total foreign direct investment (FDI) in China and 67 percent of 
FDI in manufacturing and claimed 47.8 percent of China’s financial 
capital. With more than half of China’s foreign trade and one-fifth of 
the Chinese shipping tonnage sailing through its harbor. Shanghai was 
the commercial, financial, and industrial city of China in the early twen-
5 Maddison gives China, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and Britain per capita incomes of 
600, 566, 1,024, and 1,250 respectively (in 1990 international $), Maddison, World Economy,
p. 264, table B-21. Also see Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance, p. 25, for the European 
per capita average.  
6 For Japan, Maddison gives per capita income as 12 percent and 40 percent higher than 
China’s in 1820 and 1870 respectively, see World Economy, p. 264. These are below Jiang-
Zhe’s 44 percent gap over China in the mid-eighteenth century.  
7 For Japanese revisionism, see Akira Hayami, Kinsei Nihon; and Hanley and Yamamura, 
Economic and Demographic Change. The absence of a regional perspective often accounts for 
the so-called Japanese exceptionalism vis-à-vis her Asian neighbors, as found in “Social Struc-
ture” by James Nakamura and Matao Miyamoto, where they viewed stagnant population growth 
in Tokugawa Japan as a precocious demographic transition for a premodern society in contrast 
to the case of Malthusian population explosion that gripped China during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. It is true that population statistics of 1600–1850 seems to confirm a faster 
Chinese growth rate of 0.37 percent versus that of Japan at 0.21 percent. But annualized popula-
tion growth in Jiang-Zhe was only 0.14 percent in 1630–1851, even slower than in Japan. For 
population figures of China and Japan, see Maddison, World Economy, p. 40. The Jiang-zhe 
provincial figures are from Chao Shuji, Zhongguo, vol. 4, p. 452, and vol. 5, p. 703. 
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tieth century.8 Its population doubled from only half a million in the 
1890s, to over a million in the 1910s, and to about 3.5 million in the 
1930s, making it the world’s seventh largest city.9 These staggering sta-
tistics lead some scholars to refer to China’s early-twentieth-century 
growth as Shanghai-based industrialization. 
 The Shanghai-based industrialization occurred during China’s first 
major phase of modern industrial expansion dated from the mid-1890s. 
Du Xuncheng shows that nominal annual industrial investment by Chi-
nese nationals from 1914 to 1925 was 11 times that of the 1840–1911 
period.10 The capital of a modern Chinese banking sector, largely non-
existent before the mid-1890s, multiplied at an annual rate of 10.2 per-
cent between 1897 and 1936. C. F. Remer displays a corresponding 
growth in foreign investment at annual rates of 8.3 percent, 5 percent,  
and 4.3 percent respectively for Shanghai, Manchuria, and the rest of 
China between 1902 and 1931. Railroad mileage built surged from a 
mere 364 kilometers until 1894 to over 21,000 by 1937. The national 
industrial output index constructed by John Chang, shows an annual 
real growth rate of 10 percent for the period of 1912–1936, a phenome-
nal growth rate by the standard of the time.11
 John Chang’s industrial output index covers the output of modern 
“factory” employing seven or more workers. It includes 15 products, ten 
of which are mineral and metallurgical commodities. Overall, these 15 
products cover between 40 and 50 percent the total modern factory out-
put.12 The growth rate implicit in the Chang index turns out to be up-
ward biased due to its over-representation of the fastest-growing mining 
sectors, part of which was launched in Manchuria of Northeast China 
under Japanese colonialism from 1931.13 Recently, Toru Kubo revised 
Chang’s annual series by updating the cotton output series and adding 
8 See the Appendix; Xiong, Shanghai, vol. 1, p. 19; Remer, p. 97; and Zhang, Zhong-li, Jin-
dai Shanghai, pp. 312–13.  
9 Murphey, Shanghai, p. 22. 
10 The calculation is from Cheng Linsun, Banking, p. 41. If the mid-1890s rather than 1911 as 
the cut-off period were used, the contrast of industrial expansion versus stagnation would be 
even sharper.  
11 See Cheng, Linsun, Banking, p. 71; Remer, Foreign Investment, p. 73; Yan Zhongpin et al., 
Zhongguo, p. 180; and Chang, Industrial Investment, pp. 60–61.
12 See Chang, Industrial Development, p. 36; and Kubo, Industrial Development, p. 11. 
13 This bias is noted by Chang himself. To gauge the extent of the bias, Chang shows sepa-
rately the industrial output series between Manchuria and China proper (which is the rest of 
China excluding Manchuria) whose real annual growth rates turn out to be 14 percent and 6.4 
percent respectively in 1926–1936 (Industrial Development, p. 103). In a separate study on the 
Manchurian economy, Kang Chao gives a real growth rate of 8.8 percent for modern industry 
during the same period (Economic Development, p.84). As Chao’s sectoral coverage of modern 
industry is much larger (therefore a correspondingly smaller share for the mining sector) than 
Chang’s, its slower rate for Manchuria (8.8 percent versus 14 percent) confirms the upward bias 
inherent in the Chang index due to its large weight assigned to the fast-growing mining sector. 
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important light industrial products such as silk and flour. The Kubo in-
dex as presented in Table 1 raises the total coverage to 72 percent and 
reduces the real annual growth rates to 8.4 percent for 1912–1936.14
 We now compare these national indices with the new modern indus-
trial gross output series for Shanghai constructed by Xu Xinwu and 
Huang Hanming, for the benchmarks of 1895, 1911, 1925, and 1936 
based on 1936 prices. The Shanghai index by Xu and Huang, as pre-
sented in Table 1, covers nine sectors including textiles (cotton, silk, 
and wool), flour milling, matches, cigarettes, paper, pharmacy, and ma-
chinery repair as well as estimates for other sectors. In the absence of 
any mining sectors, modern industry in Shanghai attained a real annual 
growth rate of 9.6 percent, faster than the Chinese national average of 
8.4 percent as revealed by the Kubo index. Because the national average 
included the fast-growing Shanghai and Manchuria, the difference in 
growth rates between Shanghai and the rest of China outside of these 
regions would be larger than is shown in Table 1.15
 Modern industrial growth in Shanghai compares favorably with Japa-
nese industrial performance as measured by those produced by modern 
factories employing more than five workers. Table 1 shows that Shang-
hai’s growth rate leads Japan both for the 1895–1911 and the 1912-
1936 periods, matched possibly only by Korea in the Japanese colonial 
era of 1912–1936.16
 Shanghai-based industrialization spilled over to the rest of China but 
most directly to her immediate hinterland, the Lower Yangzi region. For 
the Lower Yangzi, Shanghai became a massive draw for labor and a 
major source of capital and entrepreneurship. Shanghai capital sup-
ported the renowned scholar-bureaucrat-entrepreneur Zhang Qian in 
turning Nantong in Jiangsu province into an industrial city. Capital in-
fusion from Wuxi-born industrial tycoons in Shanghai transformed the 
market town of Wuxi into China’s fifth largest industrial city by the 
14 The new Kubo index also confirms Rawski’s crude point estimates of modern industry 
made for this period. Rawski’s point estimates of factory output between 1912 and 1936 (in 
1933 prices) had a broader coverage of sectors with a 73 percent share of total output and a real 
growth rate of 8.1 percent. See Rawski, Economic Growth, pp. 353–59. 
15 Assuming Shanghai and Manchuria having a 60 percent share in China’s modern industry 
in the 1930s and a combined growth rate of 9.6 in 1911-36 versus an overall 8.4 percent growth 
rate for the whole of China, a back-of-the envelope calculation would give a 6.6 percent annual 
growth rate for the rest of China excluding Shanghai and Manchuria.  
16 See Ohkawa, Growth Rate, p. 78. Note that as the growth spurt of modern industry in Japan 
started well before 1895, Japanese industrial expansion in the twentieth century started from a 
larger base than did Shanghai’s. For industrial growth in Taiwan and Korea during this period, 
see Mizoguchi and Umemura, Basic Economic Statistics, pp. 273 and 276, respectively.  
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TABLE 1
ANNUALIZED REAL GROWTH RATES OF MODERN INDUSTRY OUTPUT IN CHINA 
AND JAPAN 
(percentages) 
  China     
  Chang Index  Kubo Index  Shanghai  Japan 
1880–1895       10
1895–1912     9.4  5.7
1912–1925 12.6  10  12  8.6
1925–1936 7.4  5.4  6.5  9.5
1912–1936 10.2  8.4  9.6  8.3
Sources: The Chang index is from Chang, Industrial Development, p. 60, table 14. The Kubo 
index from Kubo, “Industrial Development.” The Shanghai series is from Xu and Huang, 
Shanghai, p. 342. Both Chang and Kubo indices are in 1933 prices and the Shanghai index by 
Xu and Huang is in 1936 prices. The Japanese series of factory manufacture is from Ohkawa, 
Growth Rate, pp. 79–80. The manufacturing price deflator is from Ohkawa et al., Estimates,
pp. 192–93. 
1930s, which was then dubbed “Little Shanghai.”17 Towards the 1930s, 
industrial production in Shanghai was moving from labor-intensive con-
sumer goods towards more capital-intensive sectors, with low-value-
added sectors steadily migrating to other regions, particularly southern 
Jiangsu. In 1933 the industrial output of Jiangsu province reached about 
13 percent of that of China proper (excluding Manchuria), trailing only 
behind Shanghai and Japanese-controlled Manchuria.18
 Shanghai-based industrialization also impacted the agriculture sector. 
Industrial demand brought direct impetus to the improvement of major 
industrial cash crops such as cotton and silk cocoons through the diffu-
sion of new scientific seeds and practices; and accelerated the adoption 
of commercial fertilizers and the introduction of power-driven agricul-
tural machines such as water pumps and rice and flour mills.19
The Regional Production Accounts 
 The most comprehensive way to register economic activities is the 
national income framework. The pioneering research of Ou Baosan et 
al. and Liu and Yeh provided the first set of Chinese GDP estimates of 
17 For Shanghai investors’ financial involvement in the Nantong enterprise, see Elisabeth 
Koll, From Cotton Mill, p. 63 and chapter 6. For Shanghai capital on Wuxi, see Yu Xiaobo, Bi-
jiao, pp. 241–48. For the impact of Shanghai industrialization on urbanization in the Lower 
Yangzi region, see Ma Junya, Hunghe, Introductory Chapter. 
18 See the Modern Factory section in the Appendix. 
19 See Ma Junya, Hunghe, pp. 67–79. 
Economic Growth in the Lower Yangzi 363 
reasonable quality for the 1930s.20 I employ their national-level GDP 
framework to calculate the total net value added (NVA) of all 13 sectors 
for Jiang-Zhe. I first estimate the ratio of Jiang-Zhe gross value output 
(GVO) in China’s total and then use this ratio to multiply China’s NVA 
for that sector to derive the Jiang-Zhe NVA.21 Mathematically it is ex-
pressed as 













where i stands for the ith of the 13 sectors and R stands for the Rth prov-
inces or city, namely, Jiangsu, Zhejiang province and the city of Shang-
hai. The Jiang-Zhe Net Domestic Product (NDP) is the summation of all 
13 sectors’ net value added. As Liu and Yeh’s estimation of Chinese 
GDP conducted in 1965 is much more consistent in terms of theoretical 
framework and price and quantity information, I use their national GDP 
figure and NVAs for all the 13 sectors. My contribution here, as shown 
in the Appendix, is to derive the GVO ratio of Jiang-Zhe for China. For 
that, I make use of the rich regional-level data from Ou et al. as well as 
other available sources as detailed in the Appendix.22
 Table 2 presents my estimate of the Jiang-Zhe NDP for the 1930s 
with a detailed breakdown of all 13 sectors. The details of data sources 
and calculations are reported in the Appendix. Of the 13 sectors esti-
mated, the coverage of products for agriculture in this study is 67 per-
cent of the total, 60 percent for handicrafts, and 100 percent for modern 
20 Ou et al., Zhongguo Guomin Suode; and Li and Yeh, Economy. There are other GDP esti-
mates for the 1880s, the 1910s, and 1946. They rely heavily on backward or forward projection 
from the 1933 benchmark estimate. For the 1880s, 1910s, and 1946 GDP estimates, see respec-
tively, Chang Chungli, Income, appendix; Yeh, “China’s National Income”; and Ou et al., 
Zhongguo Guomin Suode.
21 This formula implicitly assumes the ratio of GVOs between China and Jiang-Zhe are equal 
to the ratio of NVD, an assumption that could introduce upward bias in the Jiang-Zhe aggregate 
NVA estimate given that Jiang-Zhe’s NVD to output ratio was likely lower than that of China. 
However, this bias is likely to be insignificant. We can illustrate with an example of Japanese 
and Chinese agriculture in the 1930s, whose NVD-output ratios are about 0.84 and 0.9 respec-
tively. See Ohkawa and Shinohara, Japanese Economic Growth, p. 290; and Liu and Yeh, 
Economy, p. 140. Applying the Chinese ratio of 0.9 ratio to both countries, only leads to an up-
ward bias of only 0.7 percent for the agricultural NVD for Japan.  
22 Both Liu and Yeh and Ou et al. consistently included the whole of China by adding the re-
gional figures for Japanese-controlled Manchuria where necessary. In cases where regional data 
other than those Ou et al.’s are used, I have made similar adjustments to ensure geographic con-
sistency. For example, for sectors such as agriculture and modern industry, I have added the 
Manchuria data into the national total as explained in the Appendix.  
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TABLE 2
NET DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY SECTOR OF ORIGIN FOR CHINA AND THE  
JIANG-ZHE PROVINCES IN 1933 
(in billion yuans) 






Agriculture  18.76 2.81 15
Factories 0.64 0.37 57
Handicrafts  2.04 0.41 20
Mining 0.21 0 Negligible
Utilities  0.13 0.059 45
Construction 0.34 0.1 30
Modern transportation and communication  0.43  0.09  21 
Old-fashioned transportation  1.2  0.29  24 
Trade 2.71 0.76 28
Government administration  0.82  0.1  12 
Finance 0.21 0.14 65
Personal services  0.34  0.082  24 
Residential rents  1.03  0.25  24 
Net domestic product   28.86  5.45  19 
Per capita NNP (yuan)  57.36  88.92  155 
Population (millions)  503.1  60.4  12 
Land area (million square kms)  966  21  2
Cultivated area (million shi mou)  1,543  143  9.3
Sources: See the Appendix. Population for Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Shanghai were 34.9, 22, and 
3.5 million respectively. See Liu and Yeh, Economy, pp. 178–79; and Murphey, Shanghai, p. 
22. Cultivated acreages for China, Jiangsu, Zhejiang were 1,534, 92 and 51 millions respec-
tively, see Liu and Yeh, Economy, p. 129. Land area is from the China State Statistical Bureau 
cited in Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance, p. 181. 
industry. As usual, data for service sectors are more problematic. How-
ever, except for three sectors (less than 9 percent of the NDP), which 
were guess-estimated from crude assumptions, all other sectors are sup-
ported by some form of regional data. 
 Table 2 shows that in 1933 the Jiang-Zhe provinces, with a 12 per-
cent share of the Chinese population, contributed 15 percent of agricul-
ture, 20 percent of handicrafts, 57 percent of modern factory output, 65 
percent of finance and 45 percent of modern utilities services. Taken to-
gether the Jiang-Zhe provinces had 19 percent of China’s NDP, with a 
per capita NDP 1.55 times the national average. Output produced by 
modern factories had a much larger impact in Jiang-Zhe, reaching 7 
percent of NDP versus only 2 percent for China. The share of modern-
factory in total manufacturing output (including both factory and tradi-
tional handicraft production) was 47 percent for Jiang-Zhe versus only 
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24 percent for China. This ratio likely puts Jiang-Zhe on about the same 
level as Japan in the 1900s or the 1910s.23
 Rawski’s unpublished manuscript also offers a GDP estimate for 
what he defines as the “Lower Yangzi Core” in the 1930s. His per cap-
ita income estimate for the core is only 37 percent above the national 
average, lower than my 55 percent. His “Lower Yangzi Core” has a 7.8 
percent share of China’s population compared to 12 percent for Jiang-
Zhe. As Rawski’s manuscript does not present details of geographic 
definition or data sources, it is hard to pinpoint the sources of discrep-
ancy. My crude guess is that there are differences in geographic cover-
age and possible underestimation of agricultural and handicraft sectors 
in his estimates.24
Growth and Structural Change 
 Rawski’s 1989 book, Economic Growth in Prewar China, provides a 
most comprehensive reassessment of Chinese economic growth during 
the Republican era and derives a new estimate of national per capita in-
come growth rate of 1.1–1.2 percent, not much below the Japanese rate 
of growth of about 1.4 percent between the 1910s and 1930s. This is a 
remarkably optimistic assessment compared with earlier estimates of 
annual growth rate of per capita GDP at 0.33 percent for this period.25
As there is no 1914–1918 benchmark GDP data for China. Rawski, fol-
lowing Yeh Kung-chia, use sectoral series of real growth rates to derive 
the real GDP growth rates between 1914–1918 and 1931–1936. 
 Given the small share of the fastest growing modern sectors, Rawski’s 
upward revision of per capita Chinese GDP growth rate between 1914–
1918 and 1931–1936 from Yeh’s 0.33 percent to 1.1–1.2 percent hinges 
on a reassessment of the agricultural sector, which accounted for more 
than 60 percent of GDP. In the absence of reliable agricultural output 
data for 1914–1918, Rawski uses the growth rate of several scattered se-
ries of agricultural real wages to derive his real per capita agricultural 
output series between the 1910s and 1930s. The annual 1.4–1.7 percent 
growth in per capita agricultural output thus derived raises his overall 
1930s Chinese per-capita income estimate 16 percent above that of Liu 
23 Factory output accounted for only 4 percent and 6 percent of Japanese NDP in 1885 and 
1900 respectively. The factory to manufacturing output ratio was 41.2 percent in 1895. Because 
the Japanese definition of factory (enterprises with five or more employees) is broader than the 
Chinese definition (enterprises with 30 or more employees), the Japanese ratio should be ad-
justed downward to be comparable. See Ohkawa and Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth,
pp. 15 and 80–82. 
24 See Rawski, “Economy,” p. 68 for his estimate. 
25 See Rawski, Economic Growth, p. 330; and Yeh, “China’s National Income,” p. 120. 
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and Yeh’s original estimate. Without this upward revision in agricultural 
output, Rawski’s revised per-capita income would only be 6 percent 
higher than the Liu and Yeh estimate and the annual GDP per capita 
growth rate between the 1910s and 1930s would decrease to 0.5 percent, 
not that different from the original 0.33 percent rate by Yeh.26
 Here, I establish a case of regional economic growth without such 
“aggressive” assumptions about agricultural performance. Given there 
are no sectoral growth rates for Jiang-Zhe provinces during this period, 
I use the same rates for China established by Rawski except for agricul-
ture, where I use Yeh’s original rate of 0.8 percent. Because Jiang-Zhe 
is likely to grow faster at the sectoral level than China, the assumption 
of equal rates for the two establishes a lower-bound estimate for Jiang-
Zhe GDP growth rates between the 1910s and 1930s, with differences 
in growth rates between Jiang-Zhe and China driven entirely by their 
different sectoral weights.
 Table 3 shows that annual per capita NDP growth in both Jiang-Zhe 
provinces, at 1 percent, were roughly double that of China and almost 
matched those of Japan and her colonies during this period. So, even in 
the absence of the “Rawskian” type of upward revision in agricultural 
output growth, the growth rate in per capita terms in Jiang-Zhe—not 
China—had already achieved rates comparable to those of her East Asian 
neighbors. If we apply Rawski’s revised agricultural growth rate of 1.55 
percent rather than the original 0.8 percent used by Yeh and hold every-
thing else the same, the overall Chinese per capita GDP between 1914–
1918 and 1931–1936 is raised to 1 percent per year, and the Jiang-Zhe 
per capita GDP growth rate attains 1.4 percent, giving the region one of 
the highest growth records in East Asia for the period.27 In either sce-
nario, the case for regional growth can be established beyond dispute. 
 The case for regional growth can be further strengthened if we com-
pare the growth rate in Jiang-Zhe with the rest of China excluding Ji-
ang-Zhe and Manchuria. With an overall Chinese per capita growth rate 
of 0.53 between the 1910s and 1930s, and assuming a combined annual 
per capita growth rate of 1 percent for Jiang-Zhe and Manchuria with a 
total of 25 percent share in overall Chinese GDP, the annual per capita 
GDP rate of growth for the rest of China (excluding Jiang-Zhe and 
Manchuria) will be 0.37. This is just about a third of the growth rate of 
Jiang-Zhe in this Republican era, a finding that confirms Rawski’s ob-
servation that “regional growth in Manchuria, . . . and probably in the 
26 See Rawski, Economic Growth, pp. 280–337.  
27 It is important to note that as population growth rates in Japan and her colonies were higher 
than that of Jiang-zhe and China for this period, the gap in total output growth remains despite 
the comparable per capita rates as shown in Table 3. 
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TABLE 3
PER CAPITA NDP AND NDP COMPOSITION IN EAST ASIA IN 1914–1918 AND  
1931–1936







Region Japan Taiwan Korea  Manchuria 
1914–1918
Per Capita NDP  52.4 75.2 83.2 161 102 64  
As percentage of China  100 143 159 305 195 122  
NDP Composition (in %)         
 Agriculture  71 60 57 29 48 66  
 Industry  8 10 11 20 29 7  
 Services   21 30 32 51 23 24  
1931–1936
Per Capita NDP  57.4 88.9 100 203  132  77  69 
As percentage of China    100 155 174 354 230 134 120 
NDP Composition (in %)         
 Agriculture  65 52 47 19 44 53 36 
 Industry  10 14 16 28 27 13 20 
 Services   25 34 37 53 29 34 44 
Annual per capita NDP 
growth rate between 
1914–1918 and  
1931–1936  0.53 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.1  
Population (million) in  
1931–1936  503.1 60.4 44.7 67.2 5.1 21.2 38.7 
Source Notes: The averages of NDP (all in 1934–1936 constant prices) and population in 1914–
1918 and 1931–1936 for Japan, Taiwan, and Korea are calculated from Mizoguchi and Ume-
mura, Basic Economic Statistics, pp. 228–29, 232–33, and 236–37, respectively.  
 “Industry” includes factory, handicrafts, and mining. “Services” include sectors other than ag-
riculture and industry.  
 Growth rates used for the 13 sectors (except for agriculture) to project the 1931–1936 China 
and Jiang-Zhe series backward to the 1914–1918 are from Rawski, Economic Growth, p. 274. 
They are 0.8, 8.1, 8.1, 8.1, 1.4, 4.6, 3, 1.9, 2.5, 5, 3.4, 0.9, and 0.8 percent respectively for agri-
culture, modern factory, mining, utilities, handicrafts, construction, modern transportation and 
communication, traditional transportation and communication, trade, finance, government ad-
ministration, personal services, and residential rents.  
 Population figures for China and Jiang-Zhe provinces in 1914–1918 are 440 and 54.1 million, 
respectively. China’s 440 million population in 1914–1918 is from Yeh, “China’s National In-
come,” p. 104. The population figures for Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces are 33.7 and 19.2 mil-
lion, respectively, from Perkins, Agricultural Development, p. 212. Adding the 1.2 million 
Shanghai population sums to 54.1 million for Jiang-Zhe (Shanghai population is from Murphey, 
Shanghai, p. 23).  
 The Lower Yangzi Macro-Region per capita income can be calculated as: YLY = (YJZ - YC ?
PEX ) ÷ PLY; where YLY, YJZ and YC, stand for the per capita incomes of the Lower Yangzi Macro-
Region, Jiang-Zhe, and China respectively, and PLY and PEX denote the respective population 
shares of the Lower Yangzi Macro-Region and the remaining four prefectures in Jiang-Zhe 
provinces. The prefectural-level data in 1910 is from Chao Suji, Zhongguo Renkoushi, vol. 5, 
pp. 691–92, which shows that population in the Lower Yangzi Region had a share of 74 percent 
of the Jiang-Zhe provinces. The same 74 percent is applied to calculate the 1931–1936 popula-
tion of the Lower Yangzi Macro-Region. 
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TABLE 3 — continued 
 Manchuria (for 1934) is from Eckstein, Chao, and Chang, “Economic Development,” 
pp. 254–55. These estimates of per capita income are consistent with more recent work by  
Yamamoto Yuzou, Nihon Shokuminchi, p. 116. 
 The exchange rate is equal to 1 yuan = 1.1 yen calculated as the average of 1933–1936 from 
Hsiao, China’s Foreign Trade Statistics, p. 192. 
Lower Yangtze areas of China may have progressed more rapidly than 
the national average, thus ensuring that other regions experienced below 
average, and possibly negative, growth.”28
 Table 3 also confirms that the absolute level of per-capita income in 
Jiang-Zhe based on 1930 exchange-rate conversions was higher than 
those of Korea and Manchuria, ranking third only after Japan and Tai-
wan in the 1930s.29 It shows the economic structures of the Jiang-Zhe in 
1914–1918 and 1931–1936 were characterized by shares in industry and 
service sectors much higher than those that defined the primarily agrar-
ian China. With a population almost the size of Japan’s and more than 
ten times that of Taiwan in the 1930s, Jiang-Zhe was clearly the second 
largest industrial region in East Asia (perhaps Asia). 
 Table 3 shows the per capita GDP estimate of the Lower Yangzi Macro-
Region (see Figure 1), calculated assuming that the per-capita income of 
the four prefectures outside the “Macro-Region” but within Jiang-Zhe were 
equal to China’s national average (including that of the Jiang-Zhe Prov-
inces). This calculation shows that the per capita income for the Lower 
Yangzi Macro-Region in 1933 at 1.74 times the level of China, with an 
economic structure even further “advanced” than China and Jiang-Zhe. 
 Any causal statements linking these growth figures to human welfare 
should hinge on further research on consumption expenditure and income 
distribution. Existing studies based on household income and consumption 
surveys conducted during the 1920s and 1930s seem to point to higher 
household income and consumption standards in Shanghai than in other ur-
ban centers outside the Lower Yangzi. Some other surveys conducted for ru-
ral households also seem to point to similarly higher levels in Jiang-Zhe than 
in other parts of China. However, without careful control for differences in 
sampling methods and regional price effects, these findings only remain very 
tentative support for the outcome of my production-based study.30
28 See Rawski, Economic Growth, p. 271.  
29 For the conversion of per capita incomes based on purchasing power parity (PPP) for 
China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan relative to the United States in the 1930s, see Fukao, Ma, and 
Yuan, “Real GDP.”  
30 For the higher household income and consumption levels of Shanghai urban working fami-
lies, see Yang Ximeng, “Shanghai,” pp. 358–59. Yan xinzhe, Nongcun, shows that average 
household income in and around the Lower Yangzi was roughly 1.45 times that of rural house-
holds in North China, pp. 146–47.  
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FIGURE 2
ESTIMATE AVERAGE TREND IN ADULT HEIGHT BY REGION, 1900–1929 
Source: Adapted from Morgan, “Economic Growth,” figure 6. For regional classifications, see 
ibid., table 3.  
 Recent anthropometric research by Stephen Morgan seems more de-
finitive. Analyzing thousands of height records of railway employees 
across China, Morgan concludes that from the last years of the nine-
teenth century to the second half of the 1920s, the average male stature 
in China increased 0.25cm per decade but grew by 0.7cm per decade in 
Jiang-Zhe provinces. This 0.7 cm per decade height increase is only 
slightly lower than the 0.91 cm per decade increase for Japan between 
1892 and 1937. In fact, Morgan’s regional figure for railway skilled 
workers, reproduced here in Figure 2 shows that only the average height 
of Jiang-Zhe subjects (classified by Morgan as “East” in the figure) 
shows a consistent upward trend, while average heights in North China, 
Central China, and South China either stagnated or fluctuated between 
1900 and 1929. This evidence leads him to conclude a spatially differ-
entiated and uneven pattern of economic growth, a finding that lends 
strong support to this study.31
31 See Morgan, “Economic Growth,” figure 6 and concluding statement. Morgan’s classifica-
tion of regions roughly corresponds to that of Skinner. I thank Stephen Morgan for providing 
me the heights data for Figure 2. For Japanese height data, see Ted Shay, “Level.” Morgan and 
Liu, “Was Japanese Colonialism,” shows a secular increase of 1.12 cm per decade in Taiwan 
during the Japanese colonial period. However, Mituhiko Kimura’s “Standards of Living” shows 
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LOWER YANGZI ECONOMIC GROWTH IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE
Political Change and Industrial Development 
 The distinctively regional nature of economic growth in the early 
twentieth century raises some large questions germane to the historical 
origin and pattern of modern economic growth in China and East Asia. 
In fact, compared with Japan, a growth spurt that came nearly four dec-
ades after China’s encounter with Western Imperialism around the mid-
nineteenth century seems less like a miracle than a puzzle. The contrast 
is particularly puzzling given the emergence of Chinese mercantile 
dominance across regions of East and Southeast Asia after the mid-
nineteenth century under a free-trade regime imposed by Western impe-
rialism. In particular, Shanghai, as a newly opened treaty port, rapidly 
emerged as the node of a vast trading network that enveloped, among 
others, the Japanese treaty ports of Yokohama and Kobe. In fact, the 
dominance and solidarity of the Chinese merchant network throughout 
Asia posed a challenge to the young Meiji government as formidable as 
its agenda of catching-up with the West.32 To tackle the puzzle of Chi-
nese industrialization in nineteenth-century China, I turn to a brief re-
view of the economic policy contrasts between China and Japan. 
 In Japan, the new Meiji leaders who came to power in 1868 em-
barked on a comprehensive reform program to forge a modern nation-
state modeled after the West. Although the Meiji government initially 
engaged in a series of government-sponsored enterprises, their liquida-
tion by the 1880s signaled a decisive switch of its policy away from di-
rect engagements towards indirect support for the private sector. The 
government engaged in the building-up of critical public infrastructure 
such as railroads and telegraphs, the establishment of a modern educa-
tion system, the drafting of the commercial code in the 1880s, and the 
founding of the Bank of Japan in 1882. The 1880s marked the begin-
ning of Japan’s full-scale industrialization.33
 In comparison, the late-Qing government in China under the era of 
Tongzhi Restoration (1862–1874) aimed to restore the traditional econ-
omy from the Taiping devastation. The limited reform carried out under 
the banner of the Self-Strengthening Movement (1860–1894) erected a 
series of government-financed or controlled Western-style, capital-
32 See Furuta, “Kobe”; and Sugihara, Japan, p. 6.
33 See Smith, Political Change, and Ishii, Nihon. During the Meiji period, Japanese per capita 
GDP grew at an annual 2.25 percent between 1887 and 1897, raising her share of manufacturing 
and mining in total GDP rising from 8.7 percent to 11 percent and 16 percent respectively dur-
ing the same period, see Ohkawa, Growth Rate, p. 278. 
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intensive industrial and military enterprises in a largely agrarian setting. 
While these high-profile government-sponsored enterprises were 
fraught with corruption and inefficiencies, the much more deleterious 
impact of late-Qing economic structure fell on the development of a 
modern private sector.34
 Detailed case studies reveal that attempts to set up modern factories 
in sectors such as cotton and silk (that were to form the core of early-
twentieth-century industrialization) met serious resistance even within 
the treaty port. Similar obstacles confronted the building of key public 
infrastructures such as modern railroads and steam shipping in inland 
waters in the nineteenth century.35 This critical policy difference to-
wards private sector and public infrastructure held the key to explaining 
the divergent paths of industrialization between China and Japan.36
The 1894–1896 naval confrontation between China and Japan be-
came a turning point when the fruits of these two modernization pro-
grams were put to test. The much bigger guns and battleships of the 
Chinese Northern Fleet built under the Self-Strengthening Movement 
suffered humiliating loss at the hands of a smaller but more disciplined 
Japanese navy, supported by a modern economic infrastructure built up 
during the Meiji era: railroads and steam ships that mobilized troops, a 
banking system and a bond market that supported war finance.37
China’s defeat by a nation long regarded as her former student brought 
a profound mental shock, which spelled the end of the Self-Strengthening 
Movement and opened the path towards the late-Qing constitutional re-
form in 1903–1911 modeled directly on Japan’s Meiji reform.38 The con-
stitutional reform recognized the centrality of the private sector to a mar-
ket economy and paved the way for the introduction of modern public 
34 For the Tongzhi Restoration, see Mary Wright, Last Stand. For the Self-Strengthening 
Movement, see chapters 9 and 10 in Fairbank, ed., Cambridge History of China, vol. 10.  
35 The obstacles to Chinese industrialization are multi-fold. One mechanism of these obsta-
cles works through a merchant-bureaucratic power nexus strengthened by the imposition of likin
tax—a form of domestic transit tax levied in the wake of the Taiping rebellion. The govern-
ment’s need for tax revenue but inability to collect gave rise to tax farming controlled by the 
merchant guilds. Modern private industrial enterprises faced fierce opposition from both the lo-
cal guilds and government. These oppositions also threatened modern Chinese enterprises often 
falsely registered under Western ownership and located within the treaty port, as by treaty regu-
lations, Western business were only allowed to set up commercial establishments but not manu-
facturing enterprises. See Suzuki, Yomu Undou; Motono, Conflict; and Debin Ma, “Between 
Cottage.” 
36 This is a point emphatically made by scholars on modern Japan. See Ishii, Nihon, chapter 
2; Suzuki, Yomu Undou, introduction; and Smith, Political Change, p. 23. 
37 For the Japanese economic infrastructure for war support, see Ishii, Nihon, pp. 99–108. 
38 Military and strategic blunders rather than economic strengths may have accounted for the 
outcome of the naval warfare. For an argument that China’s military defeat led to an excessively 
negative assessment of the Self-Strengthening Movement and construction of Chinese back-
wardness, see Benjamin Elman, On Their Own Terms, pp. 379–82 and 392–93.  
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infrastructure.39 But the immediate economic impact of the defeat was the 
signing of the treaty of Shimonoseki in 1896 that granted foreigners the 
right to establish factories in the treaty port, lifting the floodgate of for-
eign direct investment in China and indirectly legitimizing Chinese mod-
ern enterprises. These dramatic turns of events around the turn of the cen-
tury set off the first major wave of Chinese industrialization. 
 The Late-Qing constitutional reform was as short-lived as the final 
years of the empire, which collapsed in 1911. The new Republican re-
gime, following the death of its first dictatorial ruler, Yuan Shikai in 
1916, was politically weak and fiscally insolvent. National disintegration 
and civil strife became the norm in the two decades of warlordism after 
1916. According to James Sheridan, warlords often brought terror and 
exploitation. “[Their] demand for money was insatiable and the milita-
rists wrung an astonishing array of taxes from the population. They 
printed worthless currency on a large scale. . . . In many areas, the actions 
of organized crimes were less serious than the hordes of uncontrolled 
soldiers who roamed the countryside preying on the peasantry.”40
 According to one estimate, there were some 140 wars fought among a 
total of more than 1,300 rival militarists between 1911 and 1928.41 In 
the Lower Yangzi, the least war-torn area, the war between the rival Ji-
angsu and Zhejiang warlords in 1924 led to massive forced requisition-
ing of civilian personnel and services, confiscation of private properties, 
extortion of merchants and businesses, and severe disruptions of pro-
duction and trade, inflicting total economic losses estimated between 
four and five hundred million yuan.42
 The extent of warlord damage to the Chinese economy is disputed by 
Rawski who points to the limited scale and duration of warfare. Further-
more, there were enlightened and stable warlords such as Yan Xishan and 
Feng Yuxiang who promoted economic reforms in the territories under 
their rule. The logic of Chinese warlord politics inspired Mancur Olson’s 
classic distinction between stationary bandits—those with long-tenure 
rule and thus less predatory—and roving bandits—those with short time 
horizon and consequently more destructive.43 Overall, despite the reas-
sessment of the warlord era, Rawski agrees that “political unrest and civil 
wars made any long-range investment extremely precarious.”44
39 See Douglas Reynolds, China; and William Kirby “China Unincorporated.” 
40 Sheridan, “Warlord Era,” p. 318. 
41 Phil Billingsley, Bandits, p. 24. 
42 Feng Youcai, Zaishang, p. 160.  
43 Olson, “Dictatorship,” p. 568. 
44 See Rawski, Economic Growth, p. 47 and chapter 1, for his argument about local rulers of-
ten promoting economic development. Also see Sheridan, “Warlord Era” (p. 317, footnote 35) 
for a criticism of Rawski’s assessment. 
Economic Growth in the Lower Yangzi 373 
 How did and could industrialization take root in an era of widespread 
abuse of property rights and pervasive political uncertainty during the 
Republican era? For that, we turn to a new political entity in the Lower 
Yangzi: the treaty port of Shanghai ruled by Western business elites. 
The Rise of the City 
 Shanghai, once a market town peripheral to the city of Suzhou in the 
traditional Lower Yangzi, was opened as a designated treaty port in 
1842. As a treaty port, Shanghai was under separate jurisdictions of 
British, French, and American Concessions as well as Chinese quarters. 
In 1863 the British concession merged with the American quarters to 
form the International Settlement for all Western (and later Japanese) 
residents. Following the massive influx of Chinese refugees during the 
Taiping rebellion, Chinese residents quickly formed the majority of the 
Settlement residents. 
 The Settlement operated with its own mini-Constitution: the Shang-
hai Land Regulations signed in 1854 and subsequently revised and ap-
proved in 1866. It organized a Municipal Council whose members were 
elected by the rate-payers association consisting of tax-paying Western 
and later Japanese residents in the Settlement. Judicial powers over for-
eign residents were, under the grant of extraterritoriality, vested in the 
Consular Courts of the foreigners concerned, or, in the case of unrepre-
sented foreigners or Chinese, in the International Mixed Court. This in-
stitutional structure placed the Settlement on a foundation of limited 
power and rule of law.45
 The Municipal Council levied land and property taxes and business 
license fees, ran its own prison and police squad with the additional 
support of a volunteer army in times of need. In comparison with the 
Chinese quarter governed by the local Qing government, the business-
dominated council was far more efficient in the provision of public 
goods (or semi-public goods) including the maintenance and improve-
ment of city roads, transportation and communication infrastructures, 
public utilities, and port facilities.46
45 The Municipal Council had a right to sue in these courts, and could in turn be sued in a 
court elected from the Consuls of the Treaty Powers, known as the Court of Consuls. As a gen-
eral rule, the council could make no arrests except on a warrant from the proper court. See Pott, 
Short History, p. 114; and Yang, Xiangjun, Diguo, chapter 2.  
46 In 1926 the military warlord governing the Jiangsu province Sun Chuan-fang remarked: 
“. . . whenever I come to a treaty port I feel thoroughly humiliated, not only because a treaty 
port is a standing reminder of our loss of sovereignty, but also because whenever we pass from 
the concessions into Chinese territory we feel that we are crossing into a different world—the 
former is the upper and the latter is the under-world, for nothing in the Chinese territory—roads, 
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 This governance structure of the Settlement is reminiscent of the Me-
dieval European political tradition where incorporated urban communi-
ties practiced self-rule under merchant elites or oligarchies often with 
charters granted by larger territorial rulers. From its very early days, the 
Western merchant elites of the Settlement had desired and fought for 
self-rule. This is an institutional feature that distinguished the Settle-
ment from most other treaty ports in China or even the neighboring 
French Concession, which had been under the administrative rule of the 
French consular officials appointed from Paris.47
In the wake of the dynastic collapse in China in 1911, the International 
Settlement and the French Concession realized their greatest territorial 
expansion to reach 33 square kilometers, 1.5 times the total size of for-
eign concessions in the other 23 treaty ports in China.48 When the Qing 
magistrate in Shanghai absconded—allegedly with public funds—during 
the 1911 revolution, the International Settlement took over the Mixed 
Court and began to appoint its own Chinese personnel. By then, the Set-
tlement became a de-facto city-state with full territorial jurisdiction over 
its residents, Western and Chinese. This is the second institutional feature 
that set it apart from the rest of foreign concessions in China. 
 Thomas Stephens’s study of the Mixed Court in 1911–1925 led him 
to emphatically state that “throughout all the political vicissitudes of the 
Yuan Shikai era . . . , throughout all the marching and countermarching 
of the armies of the warlords and their murdering marauding hordes, . . .  
Shanghai became an oasis of peace, order and good government in a 
China torn into convulsions by revolution, banditry and civil war.”49
The 1911–1925 period saw the transformation of Shanghai into a truly 
industrial city and ushered in what Marie-Claire Bergere hailed as the 
golden age of Chinese bourgeoisie.50
buildings, or public health—can be compared with the concessions. . . .” quoted in Feetham, 
Report, vol. 1, p. 242.  
47 Needless to say, the International Settlement was never officially recognized as an inde-
pendent political entity by the Chinese government. For a recent exposition of the city-state tra-
dition in Western Europe, see S. R. Epstein, Freedom. For the difference between the Interna-
tional Settlement and French Concession political systems, see Marie-Claire Bergere, Shanghai,
chapter 5.  
48 See Fei Chenkang, Zhongguo; and Bergere, Shanghai, p. 96. 
49 Stephens, Order, pp. 104–06 
50 For the role of the Mixed Court in the 1916 Bank note suspension incident, which was a 
turning point when Shanghai emerged as China’s sole financial center, see Chen, Banking,
pp. 53–59. For the new generation of Chinese industrial entrepreneurs in cotton textiles, flour 
milling, matches, tobacco, machinery, and large-scale retail, see Bergere, Shanghai. Chinese 
ownership share of modern industry was consistently higher than that of the foreigners in major 
sectors in Shanghai throughout the 1910s-1930s. This compares favorably with the share of in-
digenous entrepreneurship in Taiwan and Korea, or Manchuria under Japanese colonialism. 
Compare Xu and Huang, Shanghai, p. 341; with Mizoguchi and Umemura, Basic, p. 77. 
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 But beyond security and order, the institutional model of the Interna-
tional Settlement had exerted a profound and lasting impact on political 
organization, legal regime of property rights and contract enforcement, 
fiscal structure, and civil society. It laid the political foundation for a 
legendary Shanghai style of freewheeling capitalism characterized by 
free trade, free capital, and banking with a small government but a large 
civil society.51 The historical significance of the International Settle-
ment is eloquently captured by Justice Richard Feetham, the judge 
called upon to review the legal status of the Settlement in the 1930s: 
The great piles of banks, offices and warehouses along the Bund [the financial 
hub of Shanghai], as seen from the deck of an ocean liner steaming up the river, 
are at once recognized by the newcomer as evidence of the wealth and enterprise 
of Shanghai, and of the belief which its merchants and citizens have in its future. 
But they have a deeper economic significance than this; they are the first con-
spicuous signs and symbols of the sanctity of the rights of private property, as 
recognized and safeguarded in the [International] Settlement, and of the far-
reaching confidence which this condition of things has inspired.52
 The political power of the city-state spread beyond the Settlement. In 
the warlord era, the political structure of Western Shanghai uniquely 
empowered the Chinese business class to defy the political center and 
wring concessions of peace from the warlord governments. The Lower 
Yangzi became the least war-torn region in China—avoiding major bat-
tles at least before 1924—partly thanks to the political mobilization of 
the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce, the majority of the  
members of which were Jiang-Zhe natives with a huge stake in the re-
gion’s peace and order. The Shanghai capitalists also forged an intricate 
and sometimes treacherous alliance with the new Nationalist regime 
that founded its capital in Nanjing (Jiangsu province) in 1927. The city, 
especially its Chinese financial elites, helped shape the new empire—
the Nationalist regime—in the formulation of a comprehensive national 
economic policy which included the restoration of tariff autonomy, 
modernization of China’s public finance and monetary regime.53
51 For a discussion and literature on the institutional influence of the International Settlement 
on China and Lower Yangzi, see Debin Ma, “Shanghai-based Industrialization.” See Ramon 
Myers, Chinese Economy, pp. 138–40, for an argument linking the role of treaty ports (or what 
he termed as mini-Hong Kongs) as centers of free trade and finance to promote national growth 
in the Republican era. 
52 Richard Feetham, Report, vol. 1, p. 317. 
53 See Feng, Zaishan, pp. 136–39 for the role of Shanghai capitalists in the Warlord Era. For 
the political alliances between the Shanghai capitalists and the Jiang regime and various fiscal 
extortion and state coercion under the Jiang regime, see Coble, Shanghai Capitalists; Bergere, 
Shanghai, pp. 181–82; and Kirby, “China Unincorporated,” p. 51. For a recent positive assess-
ment of the National government’s tariff policy, see Toru Kubo, Sankanki Chuugoku.
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The Epilogue 
 The flowering of a European city-state in the middle of twentieth-
century China was fraught with historical irony and institutional contra-
diction. The Municipal Council’s systematic practice of political exclu-
sion and racial discrimination had turned Shanghai into a symbol of na-
tional humiliation. The co-existence of three separate jurisdictions in a 
tight and open space created a fertile ground for political agitation and 
organized crime.54 The political autonomy of colonial Shanghai was 
swept away by the full-scale Japanese invasion in 1941, followed by the 
arrival of the Communist troops in 1949, which returned China to inter-
national isolation. 
 Shanghai capitalists’ massive exodus to colonial Hong Kong, brought 
that city capital, industrial skills, entrepreneurial vision, and (as recog-
nized by the Hong Kong government) a 10–15 year head-start in indus-
trialization over many other Asian countries.55 China’s emergence out 
of isolation in the late 1970s saw the resurgence of Shanghai and the 
Lower Yangzi. Although economic growth during China’s reform era 
occurred in a different institutional context, a historical shadow of old 
Shanghai capitalism loomed in contemporary Chinese reform: the in-
creased role of foreign direct investment, the policy experimentation 
with “special economic zones,” and the preservation of Hong Kong’s 
autonomy under the “one country two systems” framework.56
 Table 4 links my 1910s and 1930s regional per capita GDP to the 
post–World War II data in a comparative East Asian framework (with 
the usual caveats against the hazards of cross-country comparison). 
Note that the relative rankings of per capita income in 1952 largely mir-
rored those of the 1930s (with Northeast China, formerly Manchuria, 
being the only exception).57 While the gap between Jiang-Zhe and 
China remains unchanged in 1978, China’s overall standing in per cap-
ita GDP had fallen far behind those market economies of her East Asian 
neighbors after two decades of isolation and command economies. Two 
54 The property requirement for voting rights ruled out 80 and 90 percent of the Western resi-
dents, leaving the Municipal Council in the hands of a tiny and powerful business elite, dubbed 
as the “Taipan Oligarchy” (see Bergere, Shanghai, p. 98). The council refused, until 1928, any 
representation of Chinese residents, who constituted 96 percent of the population and were the 
largest tax revenue contributors in 1925, and denied Chinese residents access to Municipal fa-
cilities such as “public parks” (see Feetham, Report, vol. 1, pp. 138–46). For the presence of la-
bor strikes and violent protests in Shanghai, see Wakeman and Yeh, Shanghai Sojourners. See 
Brian Martin, Shanghai Green Gang, on organized mafia. 
55 Wong Siu-lun, Emigrant Entrepreneurs, p. 2. 
56 For the resurrection of old Shanghai capitalists in the late 1970s, see Bergere, Shanghai,
chapter 14. 
57 For the legacy of the pre-Communist industrial sector in Shanghai and Manchuria, see 
Rawski, “China’s Industrial Performance.” 
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TABLE 4
RELATIVE PER-CAPITA GDP IN CHINA AND EAST ASIA 
(China = 100) 
Jiang-Zhe




(Northeast China Provinces) 
1916  143  305  195  122  
1933  155  354  230  134  120
1952  158  436  198  140  192
1978  161  1,285  571  415  149
1999  200  633  483  397  127
2005  206  401  347  313  114
Sources: Data for Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea in 1952–2005 are from Groningen Growth 
Center website (http://www.ggdc.net/homeggdc.html). The regional per capita income differ-
ences for 1999 and 2005 are calculated from relevant annual issues of China Statistical Year-
book. The data for China in 1952 and 1978 are from Xin Zhongguo Wusenian by the State Sta-
tistical Bureau.
decades of opening-up and reform enable a significant catch-up of 
China and especially Jiang-Zhe with her East Asian neighbors. Mean-
while, with the resurgence of Shanghai along with China’s increasing 
regional inequality, the economic distance between Jiang-Zhe and the 
rest of the nation attained a ratio of over two by 1999 and 2005, a his-
torical high. 
CONCLUSION 
 Through the reconstruction of a regional prewar GDP estimate and 
its growth dynamics, this article establishes the case for regional 
growth concentrated in the Lower Yangzi area and a major reinterpre-
tation of the extent and nature of Chinese economic growth between 
the 1910s and the 1930s. The narrative structures this growth in the 
larger historical context and highlights political and institutional 
changes as the most important determinants to both the timing and pat-
tern of industrialization in China and East Asia during the late nine-
teenth through early twentieth centuries. In particular, it emphasizes 
the importance of a new political entity, the International Settlement in 
Shanghai, that supplied public order and protected private property 
rights in an era of national disintegration and civil strife. The political 
structure of a city-state forged a legendary Shanghai style of free-
wheeling capitalism, a model that stood apart from the acclaimed East 
Asian model of state-led industrialization in postwar Japan and Korea. 
Nonetheless, weighed down by its colonial stigma and narrow interest, 
the city-state model of the Shanghai International Settlement is neither 
sustainable nor replicable. 
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 The tortuous path of Chinese industrialization in the nineteenth 
through twentieth centuries questions the fundamental compatibility of 
its traditional institutions with modern economic growth. While this call 
forth a larger research agenda, this article draws attention to potential 
methodological problems inherent in comparative studies that pair eco-
nomic regions with independent nation states. Situated within the politi-
cal structure of a centralized empire, economic regions such as the 
Lower Yangzi encountered constraints to institutional change far more 
severe than would independent nation-states such as Britain or Japan. 
As shown above, the rise of Shanghai first as a trading port in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century and then as an industrial metropolis was 
largely determined in the large context of political changes in the Chi-
nese empire. Within China’s centralized power structure, elements for 
change from the bottom were perennially short of political space and of-
ten survived precariously at the empire’s fringe. It is no surprise that in-
stitutional breakthroughs in modern East Asia came from new political 
structures created outside the empire: the rise of a nation-state of Meiji 
Japan after 1868 and the formation of a breakaway city of Shanghai af-
ter the turn of the twentieth century. 
 The lessons on the diffusion of the Industrial Revolution in East Asia 
also shed light on the ongoing debate on the origin of the Industrial 
Revolution. The absence of coal deposits in the Lower Yangzi, as em-
phasized by Pomeranz for the eighteenth century, did not become a ma-
jor constraint to Shanghai-based industrialization. Shanghai industriali-
zation, as noted by Rhodes Murphey, was an anomaly by Western 
standards, characterized by a local absence of most of the essential ma-
terials for manufacturing, especially coal. In the mid-nineteenth century 
when the city was opened as a treaty port, coal arrived from faraway 
England, then from Japan during the late nineteenth century, and finally 
from North China in the twentieth century following the completion of 
railroads.58
 Similarly, the much-written-about favorable geography of Shang-
hai—its central position on the coast of East Asia and the Lower 
Yangzi hinterland—seems more the endogenous outcome of geo-
political changes as acutely observed by one Chinese resident of the 
International Settlement: 
That this place was chosen as the “Settlement” precisely shows these (Western) 
barbarians have a vision. It is a global vision. Within the shooting range of 
(Western) military gunboats on the Huangpu river, the Settlement came under 
58 See Murphey, Shanghai, pp. 184–95. For discussion of the lack of coal deposits in the 
Lower Yangzi, see Pomeranz, Great Divergence, pp. 64–65.  
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effective (Western) naval protection. . . . From a closed perspective, this is a 
piece of muddy swamp with little value other than some defense against enemies 
from outside the city wall. But from an open perspective, this is the point of en-
try to China’s richest region and the departure to the world.59
Appendix: Net Domestic Product by Sector of 
Origin for China and the Jiang-Zhe Provinces 
in 1933
AGRICULTURE 
 The agricultural share of the Jiang-Zhe province is calculated through two steps. 
The first step is to use the provincial level data (1931–1937 averages) in the Crop Re-
ports published by the National Agricultural Research Bureau (NARB) added with the 
Manchurian output data to calculate the Jiang-Zhe share in physical units for each 
commodity. The results are presented in columns A through E of Appendix Table 1. 
The second step is to multiply the 1933 unit prices of each agricultural commodity by 
the 1933 agricultural output in physical units to arrive at a total agricultural gross 
value for China. This Chinese agricultural output value is then multiplied by the Jiang-
Zhe share to arrive at the Jiang-Zhe agricultural gross output value in column C. The 
final share of Jiang-Zhe provinces in agricultural value-added is then calculated as the 
ratio of Jiang-Zhe gross value to that of China shown as 0.148 in column H. 
 Note that the Jiang-Zhe share in physical output units is calculated based on the 
1931–1937 averages, but the Jiang-zhe share in gross value for 1933 is based on Liu 
and Yeh price and output data, Economy, p. 140. Their gross value for Chinese agri-
culture in 1933 amounts to 21,170 million yuan (p. 140). Because the gross value of 
Chinese agricultural products covered in this study sums to 14,110.77 million yuan 
(column F), this indicates the coverage of products included in this study amounts to 
67 percent of the total agricultural gross output for China. 
MODERN FACTORY 
 The coverage of modern factory output is the most complete thanks to the 1933 sur-
vey conducted under the able leadership of D. K. Lieu. However, the survey covered 
only the so-called “China Proper,” which is equivalent to the current Chinese territory 
but without the Japanese-controlled Manchuria, roughly equivalent to today’s North-
east provinces of Heilongjiang, Changchun, and Jilin. From Appendix Table 2, I de-
rive the Jiang-Zhe Share of China Proper as 0.663. Then I calculate the Japanese con-
trolled Manchuria share of 0.166 in China Proper from Liu and Yeh’s estimate. These 
two results enable me to calculate the Jiang-Zhe share of China total (including Man-
churia) as 0.569.  
 A new estimate by Kubo and Makino gives a higher Manchuria share of China 
Proper’s industrial output at 0.266 (table 13, p. 41). Using their estimates would have 
a negligible impact on my result (Jiang-Zhe share of modern industry would be 0.549 
59 Huangpu is the major river that crosses Shanghai. Translated from the quote in Yang 
Xiangjun, Diguo, p. 24. For discussion of the favorable geographic location of Shanghai and 
Lower Yangzi, see Murphey, Shanghai, pp. 2–6; and Rawski, “Economy,” pp. 5–6. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1
CHINESE AND JIANG-ZHE PROVINCIAL AGRICULTURAL GROSS OUTPUT (IN 1931–
































  A  B  C = A+B D E = C/D F G=ExF  H=G/F 
Rice  132,000  98,000  230,000 1,553,200 0.148 5,436.2 805   
Wheat  59,802  10,579  70,381 447,410 0.157 2,403 378.01  
Barley  27,787  6,953  34,740 159,126 0.218 576.08 125.77  
Millet  3,194  501  3,695 136,090 0.027 916.92 24.90  
Corn  12,926  1,637  14,563 126,278 0.115 539.11 62.17  
Kaoliang  10,887  239  11,126 141,309 0.079 703.64 55.40  
Soybeans  22,651  3,382  26,033 123,395 0.211 921.57 194.43  
Broad
 beans  6,751  5,290  12,041 60,402 0.199 211.05 42.07  
Peanuts  6,418  521  6,939 53,460 0.130 348.4 45.22  
Sweet po- 
    tatoes  37,923  14,974  52,897 342,471 0.154 611 94.37  
Rapeseed  3,456  4,006  7,462 49,238 0.152 247.8 37.55  
Sesame  1,864  143  2,007 16,780 0.120 154.4 18.47  
Cotton  3,697  548  4,245 16,316 0.260 596.6 155.22  
Tobacco  158  386  544 12,460 0.044 596.6 14.84  
Cocoons  420  1,200  1,620 4,200 0.386 340 40.50  
Tea  1.55  508.97  511 4,278 0.120 105 15.55  
Total          14,110.77 2,109.47 0.148
Sources: For gross output in physical quantities, rice output is from Liu and Yeh, Economy, 
p. 290; tea is from Ou et al. eds., Zhongguo Guomin Suode, (vol. 2), p. 11; cocoons are for the 
early 1920s from Perkins, Agricultural Development, p. 286; and the rest are the 1931–1937 av-
erages (1,000 piculs) from the various issues of Crop Reports by NARB summed up in Shina 
Nongyou Kisou Tokei Shiryou, vol. 2 published by Toa Kenkyujyou. Note that the original Crop 
Reports only covered 22 provinces, the Shina Nongyou Kisou Tokei Shiryou added the Manchu-
ria agricultural output to make to the China total, which is used here. Although the national ag-
ricultural output given by the Crop Reports, which I used for calculating the regional GVO ra-
tio, are known to be under-estimates corrected by Perkins (Agricultural Development) and Liu 
and Yeh, Economy, this will not affect my regional ratio as long as the national and regional es-
timates in the Crop Reports are both downward biased. 
 Column F for China gross value is the product of 1933 commodity prices and output. Price 
and output data are from Liu and Yeh, Economy, p. 136 and p. 300, respectively. Cocoon price 
is from Perkins, Agricultural Development, p. 288. 
instead of 0.569). In view of the preliminary nature of their revision, I have stayed 
with the Liu and Yeh figure.
HANDICRAFT 
 For calculating the share of Jiang-Zhe provinces in Handicraft value added, I use 
the provincial level handicraft gross output value data in Volume 2 of Ou, Baosan et 
al.’s book, Zhongguo Guomin Suode, to calculate the Jiang-Zhe share for 12 products. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 2
CHINA’S GROSS OUTPUT VALUE BY MODERN FACTORY 
(1,000 yuans) 
 Gross Industrial Output in Vol. 3 





5. Jiang-Zhe (= 1 + 2 + 3 + 4) 1,046,067
6. China Proper (excluding Manchuria) 1,577,590
7. Jiang-Zhe share of China proper (line 5 ÷ line 6)  0.663
 Gross Industrial Output Estimate 
by Liu and Yeh 
8. Manchuria Total 376,700
9. China Proper Total 2,268,800
10. Manchuria share of China Proper  
 (= line 8 ÷ line 9) 
 0.166 
11. Jiang-Zhe share of China Total (including Manchuria)
 = Line 5 ÷ [ line 6 x (1 + 0.166)] 
 0.569 
Shanghai Share = line 1 / [ line 6 x (1 + 0.166) ]  0.41
Source: The gross industrial output in vol. 3 of D. K. Lieu’s survey is summarized in Kubo and 
Makino, table 2, p. 29. Makino and Kubo’s table also listed provincial level industrial output 
data from Vol. 2 of Lieu’s survey. Vol. 2 data would give the Jiang-Zhe a higher share of 0.596 
in China’s total (including Manchuria). I have opted for the vol. 3 figure because it had a wider 
coverage of factories than vol. 2. The gross industrial output estimate by Liu and Yeh is from 
Economy, p. 428, table F-1. 
Unfortunately, there is no solid provincial-level data for most other handicraft 
products including some of the most important items such as flour and rice milling, 
cotton and silk goods, or oil products. I make rough estimates of these shares based 
on a variety of sources with different cross-checks. In particular, as most of these 
handicraft productions are highly localized, agricultural sideline activities, I use 
provincial shares of agricultural raw materials as proxies for shares of handicraft 
output. In Appendix Table 3, columns A through E derive the Jiang-Zhe shares of 
each of these 19 items. Then I multiply this Jiang-Zhe share to the total Chinese 
Net Value-added (NVD) to derive the Jiang-Zhe NVD in column G. China Net 
Value-added in column F is from Ou et al, Zhongguo Guomin Suode, vol. 1, pp. 
65–66. The final Jiang-Zhe share in national handicraft NVD is 0.21. This ratio 
matches surprisingly well with a government survey in 1936 showing that the Ji-
ang-Zhe share in total agricultural by-products is 0.22 (cited in Wang Jin-yu, Jindai 
Zhongguo Zhiben Zhuyi, p. 101). 
 Note that as the total net value added of China’s handicraft product amounts to 
1,340,078 thousand yuan (Ou et al, Zhongguo Guomin Suode, vol. 1, p. 66), the 19 
products included here (with total net value added summed to 796,823) would con-
stitute about 60 percent of total handicraft NVD in China. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 3
JIANG-ZHE PROVINCES HANDICRAFT NET VALUE-ADDED FOR THE 1930S



















 189    8,295 
    
2. Machinery 
repair
 655  205 6,718 11,782 0.64 3,574  2,299 
3. Metal 
products
 68  98 1,470 3,417 0.48 342  163.7 
4. Electric 
machinery 
 30  197 1,394 3,007 0.54 1,013  546 
5. Pottery and 
chinaware 
 1,200  438  25,063 0.07 15,153  990 
6. Lime  2,808  528  16,936 0.20 5,215  1,027 
7. Coal product  323  332 1,400 3,059 0.67 1,224  822 
8. Stone and 
clay 
 247    1,000 0.25 500  123.5 
9. Match      6,253 0 1,378  0 
10. Paint and 
dyes 




   269  6,374 0.04 10,313  435.2 
12.Paper
making
 119  20,581  55,800 0.37 27,063  10,039.5 
13. Edible oil       0.13 103,231  13,420.03 
14. Cotton 
Spinning
      0.26 12,858  3,343. 
15. Cotton 
weaving
      0.26 154,346  40,130 
16. Silk-reeling       0.23 6,419  1,476.4 
17. Silk-
weaving
      0.35 30,169  10,559 
18. Flour 
milling 
      0.16 226,680  36,269 
19. Rice 
milling 
      0.23 192,434  42,336 





         0.21 
Source and derivation notes for the 19 handicraft items: 
1. Hemp weaving: Ou et al., Zhongguo Guomin Suode, vol. 2, pp. 113–14.  
2. Machinery repair: ibid., pp. 37–40. 
3. Metal products: ibid., p. 36. 
4. Electric machinery: ibid., vol. 2, p. 47. 
5. Pottery and chinaware: ibid., vol. 2, p. 60. 
6. Lime: ibid., pp. 61–63. 
7. and 8. Coal products, Stone and clay: ibid., pp. 64–65. 
9. Match: ibid., p. 74. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 3 — continued 
10. Paint and dyes: ibid., p. 82. 
11. Sugar: ibid., pp. 138–39. 
12. Paper making: ibid., pp. 152–55 
13. Oil: ibid., p. 145, provides national estimates of seven types of edible oil products but no 
provincial-level data. As traditional oil processing was highly localized, I use share of raw agri-
cultural materials to gauge Jiang-Zhe’s share of edible oil products in national output. The two 
most important oil items are soybean and peanut oil. Jiang-zhe share in soybeans production in 
national agricultural output is 0.14. Perkins’s book, Agricultural Development, provides provin-
cial-level acreage statistics for soybeans, rapeseed, sesame, peanuts, and cotton (for cotton oil) 
(pp. 258–61). The Jiang-Zhe shares of acreage in these five items are 0.11, 0.13, 0.11, 0.09 and 
0.21. I give an overall Jiang-Zhe share of 0.12 for oil products. 
14. Cotton-spinning: there is no provincial level hand-spun cotton yarn data. It is however rea-
sonable to assume a close geographical relationship between local cotton cultivation and hand-
spun cotton yarn production. So I use 0.26, which is the Jiang-Zhe share of raw cotton produc-
tion to proxy for its share of hand-spun yarn. 
15. Cotton-weaving; there is no provincial level hand-woven cotton cloth data. I the 0.26 Jiang-
Zhe share of cotton production in national total as a proxy for its share of hand-woven cloth 
output with the following two independent cross-checks:  
 Xu Xinwu, Jiangnan Tubushi, p. 215, shows that the Jiangsu share of hand-woven cloth out-
put amount to 27 percent of the national total around 1860. 
 Yan Zhong-ping, Zhongguo Miafang Zhi Shigao, pp. 241–51, provides a survey of regional 
distribution of hand-weaving production in selected provinces in China. The relative importance 
across difference provinces in hand-weaving production ranked in his survey matches the rank-
ing in provincial-level cotton acreage statistics for 1931–1937 listed in Perkins’s data, Agricul-
tural Development, p. 261, with Hebei province having the highest output, followed by Shan-
dong and Jiangsu. This is a confirmation of the relationship between local cotton cultivation and 
hand-weaving production. Both these two cross-checks are far from perfect, but they offer sup-
port that the 0.26 share I chose is possibly within reasonable bounds of accuracy. 
16. Silk-reeling: using data compiled by Japanese scholar Shigemi Uehara, Ou et al., Zhongguo
Guomin Suode, vol. 2, pp. 102–03, shows that total raw silk output figures (both machine and 
hand-reeled) for Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and China proper (excluding the Japanese occupied Man-
churia) were 36,405, 106,230 and 300,788 piculs respectively for 1927. Ou et al., ibid., p. 102, 
shows the total raw silk output for both China total (including Manchuria) and Manchuria as 
well as prices for Zhejiang and Manchuria raw silk in 1933. Based on this, I calculate the Man-
churia share in China’s total gross output value as 18 percent. From this, I derive the Jiang-Zhe 
share in China’s total raw silk output as equal to 0.40 [= (36,405 + 106,230) / (300,788 * 1.18)]. 
To calculate the Jiang-Zhe share in hand-reeled raw silk, I use the information (Ou et al., ibid., 
p. 102) that machine-reeled raw silk was about 41 percent of total raw silk output and the Jiang-
Zhe share of machine-reeled raw silk output was 65 percent of China (ibid., p. 101, table 5) to 
derive the ratio of 0.23 [ = (0.40 – 0.41 * 0.65) / (1 – 0.41)] for Jiang-Zhe share of hand-reeled 
raw silk in China’s total.  
17. Silk-weaving: the Lower Yangzi region has traditionally been the premium producing re-
gion. Ou et al, ibid., p. 104, shows that the Jiang-Zhe share of machine-woven silk goods 
amounts to more than 70 percent of the national total. Clearly, the Jiang-Zhe share of hand-
woven silk products would not be as dominant but could be higher than its 0.23 share for hand-
reeled raw silk. I choose 0.35 as the final share for Jiang-Zhe share.  
18. Flour-milling: I use the Jiang-Zhe share of wheat output, 0.16, for its share of handicraft 
flouring milling in China. 
19. Rice-milling: Ou et al., ibid., p. 126, shows the Jiang-Zhe share in rice milled in modern fac-
tories is 0.28 of the national total. However, rice output in Jiang-Zhe is equal to 0.16 of the na-
tional total. As Jiang-Zhe provinces have long been rice-deficit region and rice imported from 
other regions are likely go through additional milling, I give 0.22 for the Jiang-Zhe share. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 4
TOTAL CAPITAL OF NATIVE BANKS (QIANZHANG AND NINHAO) AND  
PAWN SHOPS 
(in yuan) 
 Total Capita of Native Banks 
(Qianzhang and Ninhao Capital
 Total Capital of 
Pawn Shops 
Jiangsu 25,603,000  13,393,749 
Zhejiang 8,567,400  19,364,758 
China total  121,836,207  63,898,586
Jiang-Zhe share  0.28 0.51
Source: Ou et al., Zhongguo Guomin Suode, vol. 2, p. 275, for native banks and p. 276 for pawn 
shops.
THE SERVICE SECTOR 
Finance 
 For finance, one estimate claims that Shanghai`s total capital including deposits, 
convertible notes and retained earnings of banks, Native Banks (Qiangzhong), Trust 
Corp. was about 47.8 percent of China in 1936 (Zhang, Zhong-Li, Jindai Shanghai 
Chengshi Yanjiu, p. 313). Rawski, Economic Growth, estimates that deposits of native 
banks in Shanghai account for 30 percent of the national total in 1935 (p. 390). Ou et 
al., Zhongguo Guomin Suode, also provides some provincial level figures for native 
banks and pawn shops as follows. It is not very clear whether Ou et al.’s data of native 
banks and pawn shops included Shanghai. In my estimate, I use a 48 percent share of 
the national total for Shanghai and add another 17 percent for Jiangsu and Zhejiang 
provinces to sum up to 0.65 for the Jiang-Zhe share of financial services. See Appen-
dix Table 4.
Utilities
 The utilities share of Jiang-Zhe, 0.57, is calculated as the average of water, electricity and gas 
weighted by the gross value of each sector in China’s total output. The steps of calculation are 
shown in Appendix Table 5. 
Modern Transportation and Communication 
 Appendix Table 6 presents both China’s gross value output of transportation and 
communication services for seven sectors from Liu and Yeh, Economy, p. 590. The 
derivation of Jiang-Zhe share in national total for these seven sectors is presented in 
the detailed footnotes to Appendix Table 6. Multiplying these individual sectoral 
shares with the weights derived from the gross value output, I obtain the sectoral share 
weighted Lower Yangzi share of 21 percent in the national total. 
Trade (Commerce) 
 Ou et al.’s calculation (Zhongguo Guomin Suode, vol. 2, pp. 247–58) is based on the 
total number of retail stores and restaurants and the peddlers. Based on Ou et al.’s data, I 
calculate that the number of stores (and restaurants) per 1,000 in Jiang-Zhe equal to 2.7 
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APPENDIX TABLE 5
GROSS OUTPUT VALUES OF UTILITIES  
(1,000 yuans) 
Water Supply 
 Chinese Owned Foreign Owned  Electricity  Gas 
Shanghai 2,154 8,324 2,568
Jiangsu 798   
Zhejiang 155     
China 18,740 11,847 214,377 27,697
Jiang-Zhe share in each sector  0.374    0.50  0.093 
Aggregated Jiang-Zhe share   0.45       
Source Notes: Gross value of water supply is from Ou et al., Zhongguo Guomin Suode, vol. 2, 
pp. 68–70, gas is from ibid., pp. 65–68. Ou et al.’s book does not have separate provincial level 
data for electricity. I use his gross value data (ibid., vol. 2, p. 70) and calculate from Shenbao 
Nianjian (p. 569) the share of Jiangsu and Zhejiang in China’s total as equal to 0.46. As the 
Shenbao figure does not include electricity generated by factories, I round the figure up to 0.5.  
times that of China. Multiplying 2.7 to 0.12 (the L.Y. population share) gives 32 percent 
for the L.Y. share.  
 For peddlers, there is no good national survey. Ou et al.’s calculation is based 
largely on the Jiangsu data (Ou et al., Zhongguo Guomin Suode, vol. 1, pp. 107–08). I 
just assume here the Jiang-Zhe share here is equal to its population share of 0.12. Av-
eraging the two sums by value added weights gives a final Jiang-Zhe share of 28 per-
cent (the value-added weights for stores and peddlers are 0.79 and 0.21 respectively, 
Ou et al., Zhongguo Guomin Suode, vol. 1, pp. 106 and 107).  
Government Administration 
 Appendix 6 in Ou et al., Zhongguo Guomin Suode, vol. 2, pp. 277–96, has provin-
cial level government administration expenses for counties, provinces, central gov-
ernment, and foreign concessions. Appendix Table 7 shows that government admini-
stration expenses (excluding the central government) in Jiang-Zhe are about 11 
percent of the total. With the capital located in Nanjing city, I round the Jiang-Zhe 
share to be 12 percent. The central government expenses are equal to 484,525,780 
with almost three-fourth of it spent on military expenditures (p. 294).  
Construction 
 For Construction, Ou et al. defined it as the building and repair of residential and 
business housing, factories, canals and rivers, railroads, roads, ports, and transporta-
tion infrastructure (Zhongguo Guomin Suode, vol. 1, p. 77). Unfortunately, there were 
no provincial-level data in Ou et al.’s volume. The national data was based on the 
amount of construction materials used such as stone, cement, lime, bricks, iron and 
steel, and lumber. Considering the Jiang-Zhe provinces had a share of 57 percent in 
modern factories and 21 percent in handicraft production, the products of which corre-
late highly with these construction materials, I assign a rather conservative share of 
30 percent for construction in the Jiang-Zhe provinces.  
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APPENDIX TABLE 6
GROSS VALUE OUTPUT 
(million yuans) 
  Railroad  Shipping
Trucks, Taxis, 




Services  Total 
China Gross 
output
 369  137 95 13 4 44 46  708 
Jiang-Zhe
share 
 0.12  0.25 0.46 0.57 0 0.3 0.33 0.21
Notes: For railroads, Ou et al. (Zhongguo Guomin Suode, vol. 2. table 3, p. 189) has gross in-
come for all the railroads. The share of Jiang-Zhe in the national railway income is about 14 
percent. However, some of the railroads covered mileage outside Jiang-Zhe. In this case, I give 
12 percent for the Jiang-Zhe share to equalize it with its population share.
 For shipping, I used the number of junks (Minchuan) in Jiang-Zhe as a proxy for their gross 
value. Jiang-Zhe had about a 22 percent share (Ou et al, ibid., p.181). For steam ships, I used 
gross receipts of shipping companies located in the Jiang-Zhe. There were two major shipping 
companies (Minshen and Zaosanqu) which plied the entire Lower Yangzi river but with a sig-
nificant share in Jiang-Zhe. Including them in Jiang-Zhe would give a Jiang-Zhe share of 55 
percent and excluding them would yield 28 percent, I take the intermediate number 40 percent 
(Ou et al., ibid., pp. 176–77). Averaging the ships and boats using their weights in total net 
value added gives a Jiang-Zhe share of 0.25 (weights equal to 0.86 for native boats and 0.14 for 
modern ships, calculated from Ou et al., vol.2, table 9, p.185).  
 For trucks, taxis, buses, I used the number of vehicles in the Jiang-Zhe provinces as a proxy 
for the share which is 46 percent (Ou et al., ibid., p. 202).  
 For Trolleys in the Jiang-Zhe provinces, they were only operating in Shanghai whose net in-
come was about 57 percent of the national total (Ou et al., ibid., p. 202).  
 Air was very small. I just assumed it to be zero for Jiang-Zhe.  
 For modern communication, I calculate the NVD share of the Jiang-Zhe provinces for the two 
largest items, local phone and wire telegraph. They add up to over 70 percent of the net income 
for modern communication (Ou et al., ibid., table 18, p. 241). For local phone, the Jiang-Zhe 
share is 36 percent in gross income (Ou et al., ibid., table 10, p. 235) and for wire telegraph, the 
share is 24 percent (Ou et al., ibid., table 8, p. 232). The weighted average is 30 percent 
(weights for phone and telegraph are 0.39 and 0.61 respectively). Ou et al.’s provincial data for 
phone and telegraph did not include Manchuria. I use Ou et al.’s table 18 (ibid., p. 241) to calcu-
late Manchuria share being 28 percent. So the China total for both phone and telegraph in Ou et 
al.’s data was multiplied by 1.28.  
 The Postal Services share for the Jiang-Zhe share in net income is calculated as 33 percent 
(Ou et al., ibid., table 2, p. 245).  
Old-Fashioned Transportation, Personal Services, Residential Rents 
 There are no regional data on these three sectors, I used 0.24, a number that is about 
the simple average of Jiang-Zhe shares in trade and modern transportation communi-
cation and twice the national per capita average. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 7
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES IN THE JIANG-ZHE PROVINCES 
(in yuan) 




Concessions  Total 
Jiangsu  23,484,538 11,908,006     
Zhejiang  10,748,913  11,080,321     
Hanzhou  846,816  773,510     
Nanjing   2,426,175     
Shanghai  7,735,110  28,623,516   
Jiang-Zhe  35,080,267  33,149,612  28,623,516  68,229,879
China  210,344,878  407,708,136  47,796,200  618,053,014
Jiang-Zhe share        0.11 
Source: County- and provincial-level and foreign concessions data from Ou et al., Zhongguo 
Guomin Suode, vol. 2, pp. 287, 292, and 295, respectively.  
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